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INTRODUCTION
Consider a counterfactual America where there is race but no racism. An
impossibility, even conceptually, cynics and skeptics will quite reasonably ar-
gue. Nonetheless, suspend your disbelief. Imagine everyone were given a pill
that rendered them and their offspring completely and permanently blind to
race and all its amorphous indicia. As a side effect they also experienced amne-
sia about their prior racial identities and those of others. Logs of racial deter-
mination in birth certificates and other official and unofficial records were
swiped clean through a massive government program. Race remains as an idea,
a concept, in the post-pill world, but no one can observe or remember it in oth-
ers or themselves.!
Daria Roithmayr's argument in Reproducing Racism,2 taken in its starkest
terms, maintains that, without further state intervention, those people who
would have been perceived as black before the pill would, well into the future
and perhaps indefinitely, experience the same social and economic disad-
vantages they have faced for generations.' Absent additional state action, the
fate of black Americans would remain locked in a pattern established long be-
fore their birth and based on reasons no one currently recognizes or endorses.4
A stark claim, no doubt, but nobody should be surprised by the suggestion
that the children of slaves and their descendants bear inequalities carried for-
ward from a more racist past. Libraries have been written on the various ways
in which these inequalities are transferred across generations.5 What distin-
1. Rumors may circulate and persist within some circles. There would be cranks, there always
are, who claim to see in others or themselves certain qualities of race. But no court, no offi-
cial, and no one outside of certain fringe communities would give these claims any credence.
Like other past hysteria, racial accusations would be accorded the same seriousness as black
magic and witchcraft are today.
2. DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: How EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE AD-
VANTAGE (2014).
3. Id. at 11 ("And in the absence of government intervention, race will continue to matter in
many of the same ways it has mattered during the country's history, long after electing a
president who is black-or Latino or Asian for that matter- becomes a regular event.").
4. Id. at 4-5.
5. See, e.g., MARY PATrILLO-McCoY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE
BLACK MIDDLE CLASS (1999); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2011); UNEQUAL CHANC-
ES: FAMILY BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS (Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 2005); Janet
Currie, Inequality at Birth: Some Causes and Consequences, 1O1(3) AMER. ECON. REV. 1 (2011);
Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Dis-
crimination, lo9 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000); Diane S. Lauderdale, Birth Outcomes for Arabic-
Named Women in California Before and After September 11, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 185 (2006);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
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guishes Roithmayr's contribution to the inequality library is its indictment of
the mundane, ostensibly race-neutral practices we all take for granted. Racial
inequality will continue even in the post-pill world described above, but not
through overt animus or more subtle forms of implicit or institutional discrim-
ination. Rather, Roithmayr argues, our inequality is perpetuated through a set
of seemingly innocuous, if not laudable, choices people take pride in making,
such as referring a friend to a job or helping a child pay for college or a down
payment on a home.6
Friends and families, left to their own devices, will always stand in the way
of any real prospects for equality of opportunity. No one likes to think of loved
ones in a negative light, but a moment's reflection reveals this undeniable
truth - both as a practical and a theoretical matter. "[A] s long as some form of
the family exists," John Rawls wrote, the project of "fair opportunity can be
only imperfectly carried out."7 George Bernard Shaw was even more doubtful
about the prospects of equal opportunity. In a 1913 address to the Liberal Club
of London, he taunted his host, saying, "[y]ou, Mr. Chairman, have spoken of
equality of opportunity. The difficulty about that is that it is entirely and com-
pletely and eternally impossible."8 To Shaw, inequality was so inevitable and
so profound that even a pill that made everyone forget family and friends could
not overcome his pessimism concerning the likelihood of equality of oppor-
tunity.9
6. Roithmayr tidily sums up the argument in the introduction of her book:
[T]his book argues that racial inequality reproduces itself automatically from
generation to generation, in the everyday choices that people make about their
lives. Choices like whether to refer a friend (or the friend of a friend) for a job or
whether to give one's child help with college tuition turn out to play a central role
in reproducing racial gaps. Even if all people everywhere in the US were to stop
intentionally discriminating tomorrow, those racial gaps would still persist, be-
cause those gaps are produced by the everyday decisions that structure our social,
political, and economic interactions. Put another way, racial inequality may now
have become "locked in."
RorrHMAYR, supra note 2, at 4-S.
7. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 64 (1999). For an excellent recent treatment of the prob-
lem of the family in the attainment of equal opportunity, see JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTrLENECKS:
A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTuNITY (2014). "Without necessarily even meaning to do
so, parents pass along habits of appearance, vocabulary words, [and] ways of speaking,...
which can give children substantial advantages. Parents give children advantages by engag-
ing them intellectually, teaching them about the world, and, especially, instilling in them a
sense of self-worth and efficacy." Id. at 49.
8. George Bernard Shaw, The Case for Equality, in WRITING OF TODAY: MODELS OF JOURNAL-
ISTIC PROSE 218,218 (J.W. Cunliffe & Gerhard R. Lomer eds., 1915).
9. General equality of opportunity was an impossibility to Shaw, but he suggested that one
thing could be made equal among persons: "The fact is that you cannot equalize anything
2629
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Roithmayr is no pessimist. She sets her gaze on the banalities of inequali-
ty- the everyday mundane determinations that reproduce social and economic
differences along racial lines-and seeks a remedy." Her remedial preference
does not call for busting up families, but rather undoing the effects of other
combinations, so-called "racial cartels," that once dominated the political and
economic order of the country. Racial cartels may be past their heyday, but,
Roithmayr argues, their lingering effects continue to privilege white Americans
while disadvantaging certain racial minorities. Her argument proceeds in parts.
The first is historical. Roithmayr establishes that historical decisions based on
race gave whites an early advantage." Of course, every competition has winners
and losers. That's life. But, Roithmayr presses, whites won their early ad-
vantage through morally and legally indefensible conduct, acting as cartels to
exclude other racial groups from fair competition for desirable resources like
jobs, 2 education, 3 housing, 4 and wealth. Moreover, the argument continues,
after unfairly acquiring market power, white Americans instituted racist prac-
tices that reproduced their ill-gotten advantage.' 6 Racist behavior, however, is
not the central point of Roithmayr's argument: "This book is about why racial
inequality persists,"' 7 even if there is no ostensible racist behavior.
After describing the historical backdrop of unfair play through which
whites gained an early advantage, Roithmayr then considers in the second part
of her argument how the initial leg-up has reproduced itself over time across
several domains (wealth, education, social networks, and housing) through
family and other feedback loops.' 8 The third part of the argument turns to a
about human beings except their incomes. If in dealing with the subject you would only
begin by facing that fact, it would save you a very great deal of trouble in the form of useless
speculation." Id.
io. Roithmayr's project may be seen as a hopeful plea for future action of the very sort Shaw
saw as futile. Much of the futility that Shaw observed, however, derived from his view of the
impossibility of individual equality, whereas Roithmayr is more concerned with group ine-
quality. For a discussion of the latter, see Samuel Bowles et al., Group Inequality, 12 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS'N 129 (2014). It is with the group, not the individual, in mind that Roithmayr
wrote (in an earlier article), "if we can't figure out how to radically reconfigure the way that
our institutions distribute advantage and disadvantage, inequality is likely here to stay."
Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE &L. 45, 79 (2010).
11. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 25-29, 35-37.
12. Id. at 82-92.
13. Id. at 69-81.
14. Id. at 38- 48.
15. Id. at 55-68.
16. Id. at 35-37, 69-81.
17. Id. at 4.
is. Id. at 103-20.
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more theoretical discussion of her lock-in model and develops the claim that
the model provides new insight into America's persistent racial inequality.'9
The fourth and final part focuses on the responses and remedies that might ar-
rest and counter the unmeritorious, essentially automated and mundane pat-
terns of distributing advantage.'
I. MODELS AND METAPHORS
Before turning to the details of the book's argument, a word of clarification
about the title is warranted. Roithmayr is largely concerned with everyday
choices that reproduce inequality. The inequality that these decisions perpetu-
ate is correlated with race, and importantly so,2" but racist ideologies are not
themselves motivating those decisions. She does not assert that racism is a
thing of the past.' Far from it. Roithmayr's argument, rather, is that the rac-
ism of the past is no longer required, even if it is still present, to maintain the
differences it initially brought about.23 Moreover, her argument allows that rac-
ist ideologies may be maintained or reproduced indirectly through these every-
day choices, 4 but her primary targets of concern are path-dependent mecha-
nisms that reproduce inequality.'
To make the idea of path-dependent racial inequality broadly accessible,
Roithmayr relies on a number of metaphors throughout the book. From Polya
ig. Id. at 121-34.
2o. Id. at 135-50.
21. Id. at 6-8, 11 ("[I]ssues of class are, in the US, issues of race.... Owing to discrimination,
those families who can afford to pass down wealth for college educations and housing down
payments tend to be disproportionately white.").
22. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 4-5, 8.
23. Id. at 4-5 ("Even if all people everywhere in the US were to stop intentionally discriminating
tomorrow, those racial gaps would still persist, because those gaps are produced by the eve-
ryday decisions that structure our social, political, and economic interactions.").
24. Id. at 74-75, 80.
25. For comparison, take Wendy Leo Moore's usage of the same title for her 2007 book. WENDY
LEO MOORE, REPRODUCING RACISM: WHITE SPACE, ELITE LAW SCHOOLS, AND RACIAL INE-
QUALITY (2OO8). Despite sharing (part of) a title, these books reflect very different approach-
es to the study of racial inequality. Moore's book, which takes an empirical ethnographic
approach, aims to show how racist ideologies are reproduced in American law schools and
legal education. Roithmayr's approach also originated with an analysis of race in law schools
and legal education. See Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 197
(2004). But generally Roithmayr seeks to apply more social scientific models to explain why
economic and social disadvantages persist across racial groups, even without "active" racism
(for lack of a better term).
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urns 6 to Q WERTY keyboards,27 she draws liberally and frequently on various
models, examples, and analogies. Her master metaphor, however, is monopo-
ly, or, more precisely, unfairly acquired, self-perpetuating market power. Un-
fair competition, she urges, is the basic source of persistent racial advantages,
the justification for intervention, and the best means for appreciating the rem-
edies that ought to follow. 9 "In the context of monopoly," Roithmayr con-
cludes on the last page, observers "understand quite quickly the need for sig-
nificant government intervention."3" Before arriving at that conclusion,
26. RoITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 111-13.
27. Id. at 1io-i. While readers may be familiar with the QWERTY keyboard and the VHS ver-
sus Betamax stories of path dependency, the discussion of the Polya urn will be new to
many. These accounts are expanded upon infra text accompanying notes 15o-152.
2s. Id. at 132-33. Although Roithmayr is neither the first nor the only legal scholar to approach
racial discrimination and inequality from an antitrust perspective, she has been a prominent
and inventive developer of the cartel approach. See, e.g., infra note 31 and accompanying
text. Robert Cooter may have been the first to use a cartel framework to make the connec-
tion between antitrust and antidiscrimination law. Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action,
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133 (1994). Roithmayr acknowledges Cooter's early contribution and
views her work as an extension of his "ideas about discriminatory cartels." ROITHMAYR, su-
pra note 2, at 31. David Bernstein also has used the cartel approach in his works on race. See
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULA-
TIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEw DEAL (2001); David E. Bern-
stein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by African-
Americans, 74 TEx. L. REv. 781 (1998) [hereinafter Law and Economics]; David E. Bernstein,
Philip Sober Restraining Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 799 (1998); David E. Bernstein, Railroad Unions, Racism, and Labor Regulations, 5
INDEPENDENT REV. 237 (2000). In these works, Bernstein describes how racist cartels -for
example, "a cartel of racist whites" and whites-only labor unions -were able to better extend
their capacity to exclude blacks and other minorities from housing and labor markets with
government support in the first part of the twentieth century. Bernstein, Law and Economics
supra, at 825. For more recent work combining anticompetitive and antidiscrimination ap-
proaches, see, for example, Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct
Standard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2007);
Darrell A. H. Miller, Racial Cartels and the Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power, loo
KENTUCKY L. J. 23 (2012).
29. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 4-5, 9-1o. While acknowledging basic redistribution argu-
ments - for example, "that regardless of unfairness, and regardless of the inequality between
black and white, between the have and the have-nots, we ought to do as much as we can to
eliminate racialized poverty"-Roithmayr offers to "those who oppose redistribution, the
antitrust analogy... [:] It suggests that whites stacked the decks in their own favor, by rig-
ging the rules of the game." Id. at 133.
30. Id. at 157. "In the absence of restructuring, the everyday processes that we take for granted-
referring our friends for a job, choosing a neighborhood with well-financed public schools,
giving our children money for college tuition-will continue to reproduce racial inequality."
Id. Here one senses that Roithmayr advances the monopoly framework less as a descriptive
account than as a persuasive stratagem. "The lock-in story of inequality accomplishes a great
2632
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however, she devotes a significant portion of the book to advancing a particular
anti-competitive narrative- the lock-in account of racial inequality - that she
has over a number of years developed in law review articles.3
Monopoly wrongly acquired and then ossified through network externali-
ties is the core of Roithmayr's racial lock-in argument. Microsoft's antitrust li-
gation from the 1990s provides a key illustration.32 "According to the allega-
tions, Microsoft engaged in a range of very bad (and illegal) behavior,"
Roithmayr writes with an intentional colloquialism that runs throughout the
book.33 "Microsoft's bad behavior,"' combined with the basic network struc-
ture of the software industry,3 "went on to trigger a 'positive feedback loop' in
the operating systems market.", 6 Thereafter Microsoft's early unfair "ad-
vantage snowballed" and eventually "became locked in." 37 Today, Roithmayr
deal if it persuades us that we ought to move quickly toward the more inclusionary path, be-
fore locked-in racial disparities become a permanent and unchanging part of the American
landscape." Id.
31. Roithmayr is rightly credited as the principal developer of the lock-in model to racial ine-
quality and as an early advocate of the cartel approach to discrimination. See, e.g., Daria
Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727
(2000); Daria Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality: The Persistence of Discrimination, 9 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 31 (2003); Roithmayr, supra note 31, at 204; Roithmayr, supra note 1o; Daria
Roithmayr, Them That Has, Gets, 27 MISS. COLLEGE L. REV. 373 (2008).
32. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 5-6, 59.
33. Id. at S. In the acknowledgements, Roithmayr thanks her brother, who "helped me to trans-
late what had been overly technical jargon into something more comprehensible. I'll never
go back to the technical writing," she writes, "now that I've crossed over." Id. at x. Her prose
often has a Malcolm Gladwell-like quality- for instance, where she describes "the benefits
of being cool, or perhaps more accurately, the costs of being uncool" as a way of under-
standing the switching cost dynamics associated with her lock-in model. Id. at 138. This lan-
guage is intended for a general readership and is effective in that regard. Sometimes, how-
ever, the language runs the risk of being too loose.
34. Id. at 5. Among other questionable practices, Roithmayr indicates, Microsoft pursued a poli-
cy of charging computer manufacturers a licensing fee for every computer they produced,
even if those computers did not use Microsoft's Windows operating system. "If manufac-
turers wanted to load another operating system onto the computer, they had to pay twice -
once to Microsoft, and once to the developer of the alternate operating system." Id.
35. "Consumers wanted to buy an operating system with the widest range of software available.
In turn, software authors wanted to write software for the operating system with the most
customers." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 5-6. "Other competitors could not possibly overcome the software company's ad-
vantage. Notably, Microsoft's monopoly advantage lasted long after the company stopped
engaging in anticompetitive behavior." Id. at 6.
2633
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argues, "white economic advantage has become institutionally locked in, in
much the same way as Microsoft's monopoly advantage did.",
8
Microsoft's anti-competitive behavior is not, however, an ideal fit for
Roithmayr's argument. Strictly speaking, Microsoft was a single, hierarchically
organized entity, not a horizontal cartel of multiple actors, as Roithmayr char-
acterizes "whites [who] formed racial cartels during slavery and Jim Crow to
gain monopoly access to key markets." 9 Yet, cartels do organize to exert mar-
ket power like a monopolist,4" so the analogy, while not perfect, provides some
insight. This close-but-not-quite-exact quality holds for many of the models,
metaphors, and analogies that Roithmayr uses. A large part of the reason for
this misalignment is that Roithmayr is attempting something novel and dis-
tinctive for which there are no canned applications. Still, Roithmayr presents a
compelling array of supporting arguments and analogies to make her points
effectively for the lay reader.
To preserve scope for broad analogical connections, Roithmayr at times
glances past legal details and definitions. For example, although she draws at
times upon actual cartel conduct, she spends little time presenting and parsing
legal arguments that could have been used to generate liability for this anti-
competitive behavior, historically or in the recent past.4' Monopolization is
more metaphor than legal fact here. Similarly, while much is made of the
state's role in facilitating residential racial discrimination,42 there is surprisingly
38. Id. at 6. "Like Microsoft, whites engaged in early anticompetitive conduct to get ahead in
key markets -jobs, education, and housing, to name the most relevant. That early unfair ra-
cial advantage now reproduces itself through increasing returns, by way of positive feedback
loops that are embedded in every day social structures like the family and the neighbor-
hood." Id. at 6o.
39. Id. at 6. The distinction is important in terms of grasping the dynamics of the anti-
competitive conduct.
40. See JEAN TiROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 346 (1988).
41. Presenting doctrinal arguments for liability and regulation of racially discriminatory cartels
would have made the book more useful to lawyers (but perhaps less accessible to lay readers,
the target audience). See, e.g., Miller, supra note 28, at 40 (arguing that Section 2 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment empowers "Congress to prevent racialized cartels"); Darrell A. H. Mil-
ler, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the History ofJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
77 FORDHAM L. REv. 999 (2oo8); see also Ayres, supra note 28 (discussing the relationship
between disparate impact litigation and a firm's exercise of market power to extract rents
from employees or consumers belonging to protected classes).
42. Roithmayr writes: "In the early twentieth century, racial cartels were mostly informal white
organizations with little state support," but "[a] fter World War I, the role of government in
cartel conduct increased dramatically." ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 36. She notes that state
action - at the municipal, state and federal levels - was enlisted in residential segregation:
"The Home Owners' Loan Corporation, which offered low-cost mortgages to whites mov-
ing to the suburbs out of the inner city, used redlined maps to determine where and to
2634
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little discussion of the state action doctrine.4" No doubt the publisher's interest
in not sacrificing the general audience to satisfy the legal one motivated some
of these oversights. Let the law geeks read law reviews. Yet as noted next, even
general readers might have appreciated clearer definitions of "racial cartels"
and "white cartels," which are central constructs of the lock-in argument.
II. ABSTRACT AND ACTUAL CARTELS
What, exactly, is a racial cartel? The question is raised, 4 but never fully an-
swered. "Economists," Roithmayr tells us, "typically define a cartel as a group
of actors who work together to extract monopoly profits by manipulating price
and limiting competition."4" But what makes a cartel racial? A shared racial
identity among cartel members would certainly be too inclusive a criterion for
the kind of argument she is making. Otherwise, OPEC, Standard Oil, the De
Beers diamond mongers and most other known cartels might be considered ra-
cial cartels. Perhaps the key is not the membership, but the identity of those ex-
cluded. But then every private club excluding minorities would be a racial car-
tel, which may be what Roithmayr has in mind but nevertheless seems too
broad. All cartels are exclusive clubs, but surely not all exclusive clubs are car-
tels.
Moreover, when Roithmayr writes of "white cartels," it is often unclear
how far this white economic conspiracy extends. 46 Sometimes "white cartels"
whom to provide mortgage support. The Federal Housing Administration adopted similar
racial restrictions." Id. at 36-37. Moreover, Roithmayr observes, "[s]ome of the most pro-
gressive social policies adopted by New Deal legislators functioned essentially as massive ra-
cial cartel anticompetitive supports favoring white workers." Id. at 37. White southerners
"collaborated with members of the Roosevelt administration to exclude blacks from Social
Security, by exempting agricultural workers and domestic workers." Id. at 37. Beyond these
historical examples, Roithmayr delivers a searing indictment of the state with regard to, in-
ter alia, present incarceration practices and Clinton-era welfare reform policies. Id. at 103-07.
43. See, e.g., RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOcIAL NoRMs, 140-167 (2013) (discussing the state ac-
tion doctrine and residential segregation achieved through racially restrictive covenants).
44. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 29 ("So what is a racial cartel?").
45. Id. "For example, OPEC, the oil-producing cartel, restricts the output of oil by its members
in order to raise prices for a scarce commodity." Id.
46. Additionally Roithmayr in some places discusses race in a manner that seems to take its
characteristics for granted (for example, "[w]hen it comes to differences among the races,"
id. at 6o), and treats the concept of race loosely: "we can only assume that cartel conduct
could make use of whites' group identity, an identity that is both easily observed and
freighted with historical meaning." Id. at 31.
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seem to implicate white Americans generally,47 and at other times just those of
a certain generation, or of a particular, though still abstract, place (such as the
Jim Crow South 8 or northern communities with racial covenants49). When
she writes of "the white organizations of Jim Crow[,] white unions, political
parties, school districts, and associations among them,""0 one has a clear sense
of what made them white organizations (their "whites only" signs were super-
fluous), but it is still not obvious what made them racial cartels.
The puzzle of "racial cartels," as used in the book, is resolved by viewing it
as a framing device rather than in terms of strict legal or economic criteria. "To
be sure," Roithmayr has written elsewhere, "the analogy between racial cartels
and ordinary market cartels is far from perfect .... More specifically, the [ra-
cial] cartel account does not conform to the precise technical definitions of car-
tel conduct." Yet viewed metaphorically, argues Roithmayr, "the analogy cap-
tures far better than standard accounts the competitive advantage and collective
dynamic of racial exclusion." Of course she is right. As metaphor, "racial car-
tels" reveal important features of our racial history too often obscured by con-
ventional accounts. But in this history there are also actual cartels, more than
metaphors, engaged in racialized restraint of trade. Following the Civil War,
for instance, plantation owners explicitly conspired to restrict labor opportuni-
ties of recently freed slaves-"You won't hire my niggers, and I won't hire
yours"s1 - and these agreements, often supported by the state, continued well
into the twentieth century.52 Roithmayr herself provides other compelling ex-
amples of actual cartel conduct aimed at excluding competition from racial mi-
norities.53 The book's argument is sharpest and most convincing in these spe-
cific cases. But in the back and forth between analogy and actual conduct, it is
47. See id. at 69-81 ("How Whites Created Institutional Rules That Favored Them over Time").
48. Id. at 25, 35-37.
49. Id. at 41-48.
50. Id. at 41.
51. See Miller, supra note 28, at 23 (quoting John Townsend Trowbridge's survey of the South
in the winter of 1865, published as J.T. TROwBRIDGE, THE SOUTH: A TOUR OF ITS BATTLE-
FIELDS AND RUINED CITIES, A JOURNEY THROUGH THE DESOLATE STATES, AND TALKS WITH
THE PEOPLE 427 (Hartford, Conn., L. Stebbins, 1866)).
52. Southern plantation owners, as Leon Litwak observed, "often effected combinations or un-
derstandings among themselves not to contract with any former slave who failed to produce
a 'consent paper' or proper discharge from his previous owner." LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN
THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 415 (1979); see also Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219 (1911).
53. "Homeowners' associations worked together with real estate boards to keep blacks out of
housing markets. School boards worked together with local growers to keep Mexicans out
of public schools. Working-class farmers worked together with elite planters to disfranchise
blacks and eliminate their political power." ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 6.
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easy to lose sight of the level of argument suggested at any particular point in
the book's use of racial cartels.
III. RACIAL COVENANTS AND WHITE PRIMARIES: THE CENTRAL
ACCOUNTS
Roithmayr argues that throughout the twentieth century, a number of
"private business organizations functioned together in ways that resembled ra-
cial cartel activity."' 4 Among these private actors, Roithmayr describes the tac-
tics of railway workers, who organized to exclude blacks;s "agricultural grow-
ers" who "collaborated to segregate Mexican laborers"; crafts unions, citizens'
councils, and even parent-teacher associations, all engaging in "collective action
to exclude nonwhite groups from key education, labor, and political mar-
kets. ' 6 These cases are briefly mentioned, more as general sketches, rather
than as concrete examples of racial cartels. For a more sustained discussion,
Roithmayr looks at voting in Texas s' and housing in Chicago. ss
Finding racially discriminatory market manipulation in housing is, sadly,
not a difficult task, even today. s9 Locating discrimination in historical records is
even more easily accomplished, thanks to a great corpus of research developed
by scholars of race and housing over the past century. 6° Local and national real
s4. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
5s. Id. at 22-27.
56. Id. at 37. "In the South, employers maintained segregation via a network of community
norms. Outside of agriculture, employers and unions together orchestrated occupational
segregation, essentially creating a dual labor market where blacks and whites did not com-
pete with each other. Within particular industries, certain jobs were designated black jobs or
white jobs." Id. at 36.
s7. Id. at 41-48.
58. Id. at 49-52.
59. See LAURA GOTrESDIENER, A DREAM FORECLOSED: BLACK AMERICA AND THE FIGHT FOR A
PLACE TO CALL HOME 63 (2013). Gottesdiener describes how in the early 2ooos, the mort-
gage industry aggressively targeted African-American communities for sub-prime loans, ad-
vertising them in black churches and printing promotional material in a language recorded
in the computer system as "African-American." Id.
60. See, e.g., JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOwN (1949); ST. CLAIR DRAKE
& HORACE R. CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS: A STUDY OF NEGRO LIFE IN A NORTHERN CITY
(1993); ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO
1940-1960 (2nd ed. 1998); THOMAS LEE PHILPOTT, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO: IMMI-
GRANTS, BLACKS, AND REFORMERS IN CHICAGO, 1880-1930 (1991); CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAU-
CASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES
(1959); Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass,
96 AM. J. Soc. 329 (199o); Wendy Plotkin, Deeds of Mistrust: Race, Housing, and Restric-
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estate boards surely operated as cartels 6 '-setting policies, coordinating mem-
bers, and disciplining defectors -and Roithmayr effectively describes their
market-rigging practices.62
Roithmayr takes homeowners' associations to be "the poster children for
racial cartels. ',63 Chicago's homeowners' associations were "a model in efficient
racial exclusion" she writes, "[t] ightly coordinated, well run, and legally armed
with the restrictive covenant. ' ' 6' There are, however, reasons to question
whether these organizations were as efficient and effective as Roithmayr sug-
gests. First, while some Chicago neighborhood associations were better orga-
nized than others, collective action problems plagued them all. The more suc-
cessful ones had to rely on the energy of a few motivated or entrepreneurial
individuals, along with significant institutional support, such as the sort given
by the University of Chicago to the Woodlawn Property Owners' Associa-
tion,6, which Roithmayr discusses at length. Second, neighborhood associa-
tion-driven racially restrictive covenants in Chicago and other cities were often
sloppy affairs replete with legal defects.66 The historian Arnold Hirsch argued
tive Covenants in Chicago, 1900-1953 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Illinois at Chicago) (on file with author).
61. See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 43, at 23.
62. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 38-48.
63. Id. at 41.
64. Id. White homeowners' associations, Roithmayr argues, "looked a lot like a paramilitary car-
tel": they divvied up "turf on precisely defined geographic lines," and they used "tactics like
harassment and coercion to keep" blacks out of their neighborhoods, "often terrorizing
them physically." Id. at 35. As she describes them, these homeowners' associations behaved
more like gangs, or perhaps vicious drug cartels, than nonviolent economic cartels. In fact,
some homeowners' associations were more like gangs or terrorists than run-of-the-mill eco-
nomic cartels. The distinction turned often, but not exclusively, on matters of class. Unfor-
tunately, Roithmayr suppresses issues of class in this part of her analysis, although these is-
sues do resurface later in the book when she returns to housing and neighborhood effects.
65. "As one prominent NAACP lawyer observed at a 1945 conference, racially restrictive cove-
nants were usually only enforced if some self-selected agitators were especially active in stir-
ring the pot. But another lawyer at the same conference noted that it was expensive to liti-
gate these cases, a fact that dampened the neighboring homeowners' enthusiasm for doing
so." BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 43, at 86. In addition, "Robert Hutchins, then president of
the University of Chicago, rejected Earl Dickerson's request that the University not support
the white neighborhood association defending covenants in Hansberry v. Lee." Id. at 86 n.26;
(citing ROBERT J. BLAKELY, EARL B. DICKERSON: A VOICE FOR FREEDOM AND EQUALITY 97-98
(2006)).
66. See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 43, at 123 ("Neighborhood agreements were notable for their
failure to meet formal requirements -a spouse's signature missing here, a typing mistake
there, an improper notarization on the next page .... [C]ivil rights lawyers all over the
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that it was for this reason that covenants had little impact in maintaining tradi-
tional racial barriers in Chicago.6" Hirsch no doubt understated the impact of
covenants with this logic, since much of their effect was social, rather than le-
gal, and didn't depend on court enforcement. Still, the covenants imposed by
neighborhood associations were often less effective than the members sought.
Efficiency and efficacy in the use of covenants were better realized by de-
velopers than neighborhood associations. Roithmayr overlooks this aspect of
the covenant account, failing to address the role of racially restrictive deeds in-
stalled by developers in planned communities as distinct from the neighbor-S•68
hood-initiated restrictive agreements organized by existing communities.
Developer deed restrictions, which existed in both middle class tracts, like the
Levittowns developed by William Levitt, and more upscale developments, such
as those developed by the W.C. and A.N. Miller Company in the Washington,
D.C. area, were able to cost-effectively subject whole communities to racial re-
strictions in one fell swoop, and these racially restrictive devices tended to• 6 ,
avoid the legal defects common to neighborhood agreements.
Class was also a significant factor in neighborhood agreements. Given the
costs of establishing neighbor-driven racially restrictive covenants, working
class neighborhoods, like Chicago's Back-of-the-Yards district, generally did
not bother with them.7' Racial covenants operated in wealthier neighbor-
hoods,' where white homeowners could afford the expense of covenant drives
67. See HIRSCH, supra note 6o, at 30 ("[R]estrictive covenants in Chicago served as little more
than a fairly coarse sieve, unable to stop the flow of [the] black population when put to the
test."). Hirsch argued that covenants were regularly violated, seldom challenged and infre-
quently enforced by courts. Hirsch presented evidence that some judges in the Municipal
Court of Chicago refused to uphold covenants, and that many cases were withdrawn, and
that those cases that were successfully tried were infrequently enforced. See id. at 30 (de-
scribing the collapse of many Chicago racially restrictive covenants in the mid- and late
1940s); BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 43, at 124 ("At least one municipal judge declared that
racial covenants were unconstitutional. This was an opinion that had zero precedential val-
ue, but it still served as a straw in the wind about the changing politics of race.").
68. See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 43, at 12 (noting that since "there was no community at all
prior to the development, developers wrote the racial restrictions that informed new en-
trants about the behavior and attitudes that would be expected, and that also informed the
disfavored would-be purchasers that they were not welcome. In older urban neighborhoods,
where racial covenants emerged after the fact from agreements among the existing neigh-
bors themselves, the case for loose knittedness is somewhat more ambiguous. But the great-
est covenant activity appears to have been in middle-class neighborhoods .. .
69. Id. at 103-104, 185.
70. Id. at 125.
p. See Wendy Plotkin, Neighbors and Boundaries: Racial Restrictive Covenants in Chicago,
1900-1948, at 7 (1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) ("For the most part,
the communities that most enthusiastically adopted covenants were more affluent [and]
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and the costs of their enforcement 2 By the same token, minority purchasers
drawn to covenanted neighborhoods were generally themselves middle and
upper-class buyers-buyers with enough cash or access to loans to purchase
homes in covenanted neighborhoods notwithstanding the barriers erected by
the Fair Housing Administration's (FHA) discriminatory policies.73
Racial covenants in Chicago, and in the rest of the country, had a more
complicated existence than is suggested in Roithmayr's discussion. They were
not simply established legal tools used by racist cartels to achieve their limited
and foul objectives. Racial covenants were both more corrosive (generating,
promoting, disseminating, and legitimating racist ideologies through housing
policy and practice) and more constitutive of communities, including integrat-
ed ones, than is suggested by Roithmayr's analysis. For instance, racially re-
strictive covenants may have played a stabilizing role in some communities that
better educated than the white communities not covered by covenants."). However, as I dis-
cuss in other work, some less wealthy neighborhoods used both violence and covenants as
part of their strategy to maintain racial exclusivity in their community. This mix of strategy
was often born out of mixed motives. That is, neighborhood associations from middle- and
upper-class neighborhoods frequently ran campaigns to install covenants in white working
class neighborhoods that abutted black communities. The apparent motivation for this be-
havior was to firm up resistance to residential integration in the "threatened" working class
neighborhoods, which served as buffer zones between the more affluent neighborhoods and
the black neighborhoods. Individuals in these working class neighborhoods also employed
violent tactics (especially bombings) against blacks who attempted to relocate there. Richard
R.W. Brooks, Covenants & Conventions 19 n.66 (Nw. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 02-8,
2002).
72. See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 43, at 125. Brooks and Rose note that "the costs of all these
[covenant drives] added up. One association's campaign in the 1920S cost between $25 and
$ioo per property owner, a considerable sum in that era." Id. at 123.
73. See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 43, at 125 ("Thus it may not be accidental that the one major
Chicago covenant case -the one that made its way to the history books and the law school
casebooks -was instigated ... by the well-to-do [minority] real estate dealer Carl Hansber-
ry, together with Harry Pace, then the president of the Supreme Liberty Life Insurance
Company. The Supreme Liberty Life Insurance Company was a Chicago institution much
involved in African American real estate mortgages. It was especially important in the 1930s
and later, given African Americans' difficulties in securing FHA loan qualification; its
longstanding general counsel was NAACP lawyer Earl Dickerson. After taking advice from
Dickerson, Hansberry joined Pace to break the covenants of the Washington Park neighbor-
hood.., just south .. [of] the University of Chicago.. .. "). Hansberry first contested the
neighborhood covenants "when a cooperating white woman sublet a covenanted apartment
to him and his family, claiming that they were cousins." Neighbors successfully sued her,
however, forcing the Hansberrys to move. The following year, with a mortgage from Su-
preme Liberty Life Insurance Company, the Hansberry "family purchased a covenanted
apartment building through another white intermediary, this time a real estate speculator.
... The Hansberry case immediately attracted the attention of the Chicago Defender newspa-
per, which among other things sharply criticized the otherwise progressive University of
Chicago for its role in trying to keep the neighborhood white." Id. at 126.
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were already somewhat racially integrated by preventing the neighborhood
from "tipping" and thereby slowing or preventing white flight.74
Texas's all-white primary may have been a more straightforwardly exclu-
sionary cartel tool. Roithmayr presents an abbreviated, but still illuminating,
account of the collective efforts of Texas Democrats and Fort Bend County
Jaybirds to disenfranchise black voters. 7 These accounts of housing and voting
cartels are designed to get her readers to see racial inequality in a new light.
"Describing the homeowners' association and the Fort Bend County Jaybirds
as racial cartels," she writes, "serves to highlight several aspects of racial exclu-
sion that conventional theory obscures." 76 She argues that key insights are
gained when we adopt this new perspective: "First, a cartel story emphasizes
that whites benefited from racism."' Second, the "cartel story also focuses on
the way that whites worked together collectively to exclude, and the techniques
74. See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 43, at 205-06 ("Oddly enough, at least some of the older ra-
cially restrictive covenants had acted as de facto benevolent quotas in the 1920s, '3OS and
'40s, even though they were certainly not so intended. This was because... the neighbor-
driven covenants had generally taken effect when some supermajority of the neighbors had
signed, while potentially leaving the remaining residences open to minority members. Ob-
viously the older neighborhood racial covenants had not aimed at integration- quite the
contrary, the signatories would have been happy to have loo percent if they could have got-
ten it .... (R]acial covenants in fact existed in some integrated neighborhoods like the Shel-
leys' [from Shelley v. Kraemer], and they might possibly have had the effect of stabilizing
those neighborhoods racially by cabining the white residents' worries about other white
neighbors' potential defections. This is not to make excuses for the older racial restrictions,
but only to point out that their existence had many twists and turns, and that some of their
techniques might have been used for more sympathetic purposes. Clearly the traditional ra-
cial covenants - including the neighbor-driven ones - had enormous down sides, most di-
rectly in closing off minority housing opportunities, and even more importantly and perni-
ciously, solidifying the idea that racial mixing caused housing values to decline.").
75. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 49-52.
76. Id. at 53.
77. Id.; see also id. ("White homeowners created a wholly separate segment of the housing mar-
ket for themselves, a segment with higher property values, wealthier neighbors, and superi-
or housing stock. White Democrats strengthened their political power in Texas, having put
aside their class differences under the banner of white supremacy.").
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
they used to keep each other in line."T Third, "a cartel story focuses on the ef-
fect of all this exclusion on fair competition."79
But do we really need a "cartel story" to know that some whites benefited
by excluding blacks and other racial minorities, that there was collusion among
vested interests to achieve this exclusion, and that the conduct and outcomes
were unfair? Scarcity and economic competition -familiar frames in the litera-
ture on American race relations - suggest all these points. Nonetheless, the car-
tel account may be the best way to tie these factors together in an accessible
manner, and that's a valuable contribution to the literature. Moreover, and
perhaps most importantly, as Roithmayr suggests, the cartel story "can justify
government moves to dismantle the effects of such cartel behavior as a kind of
antitrust intervention. ",8 This too is a valuable contribution, but to make it
more than just a suggestion, the book would have had to engage the legal ar-
guments and details that were perhaps sacrificed to make the book accessible to
the lay reader8s
IV. WEALTH, NETWORKS, AND FEEDBACK LOOPS
According to Roithmayr's lock-in account, unfair practices led to racial ine-
qualities, and then networked feedback loops kept the differences going.82 So-
cial networks are the engine behind the distribution of resources, Roithmayr
writes. "[M]ost of us derive our well-being from our networks .... [W]e rely
on four basic types of social 'network' arrangements - (1) families, (2) friends
and colleagues, (3) neighborhoods, and (4) workplaces and other kinds of
market-based institutions."8 3 These networks create feedback loops, which are
78. Id; see also id. ("Homeowners' associations and Texas political parties used a potent mix of
violence, harassment, and legal coercion. Identity organized much of this collective action.
Defecting homeowners, real estate brokers and political parties were punished severely for
crossing racial lines. And often cartel members' own shame and guilt kept them in line
without the need for external punishment.").
7g. Id; see also id. ("Thinking about a homeowners' association as a cartel highlights that the
association acted to undermine fair competition for housing and for access to public schools.
Whites rigged the game to their advantage, in much the same way cartels ordinarily do.").
8o. Id.
81. See sources supra note 28, such as Miller and Ayres, for examples of how government inter-
vention may be justified through existing antitrust and antidiscrimination doctrine to reme-
dy racial inequality.
82. ROiTHMAYPR, supra note 2, at 6 ("This book will argue that white economic advantage has
become institutionally locked in .... This unfair advantage, acquired early in our nation's
history, has now become self-reinforcing and cumulative. A number of institutional feed-
back loops parlay earlier advantage into continuing advantage.").
83. Id. at 6o.
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the key to the lock-in model of racial inequality. "Through positive feedback
loops, inequality reproduces itself from decade to decade, automatically and in
the absence of intentional discrimination."' Roithmayr describes the operation
of networks and feedback loops in generating and maintaining inequalities in
wealth, institutional access, professional outlooks, and housing opportunities.8
5
Let's begin with wealth.
A. The Racial Wealth Gap
What explains the persistent racial wealth gap? Researchers have sought to
identify the sources of the wealth gap by focusing on earnings and education,
cultural practices, and, finally, family background and networks. Roithmayr
favors this last account. Empiricists have had widely varying degrees of success
in explaining wealth differences by race, identifying as little as five percent to
more than one hundred and twenty percent of the gap.8 6 The variation is large-
ly due to the multiplicity of identification strategies and data employed.8 ,
Nonetheless, some consistent patterns are observed across studies.88 Most
84. Id. at 57.
85. Id. at 57-68.
86. John Karl Scholz & Kara Levine, U.S. Black-White Wealth Inequality: A Survey, U. WIS.-
MADISON DEP'T. ECON. & INST. RES. POVERTY io (June 9, 2003), http://www.ssc.wisc.edu
/~scholziResearch/Wealth-survey-vs.pdf [http://perma.cc/W204-TYNQ.j ("Most esti-
mates, however, fall between 60 and 90 percent. When coefficients estimated from a sample
of blacks are used to predict white wealth, estimates range between 12 and 84 percent, with
most falling between 20 and 35 percent.").
87. Id. at 13 ("Empirical specifications vary significantly across studies, which makes it difficult
to understand how demographic variables influence wealth accumulation. Interpretation of
coefficients is also complicated.").
88. Some researchers use a basic regression model with race indicators as one of many control
variables. See, e.g., DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED; RACE, WEALTH, AND
SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA (1999); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK
WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995); JESSE OWENS
SMITH, THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC AND RACIAL INEQUALITY: A SYSTEMATIC COMPARATIVE
MACRO-ANALYSIS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE PRESENT ( 3d ed. 2003); Erik Hurst et
al., The Wealth Dynamics of American Families, 1984-94, BROOKINGS INST. (1998), http://
www.brookings.edu/-/media/Projects/BPEA/1998%2o/1998abpea hurstjluohstafford
_gale.PDF [http://perma.cc/X8TV-35R-]. Others use a regression decomposition approach,
running race-specific regressions (for example, on whites only) to predict black wealth or
vice versa. See, e.g., Joseph G. Altonji & Ulrich Doraszelski, The Role of Permanent Income and
Demographics in Black/White Differences in Wealth (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working
Paper No. 8473, 2oo), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8473.pdf [http://perma.cc/5HTS
-CN54]. In theory, the choice should not matter, but regrettably for these models, it often
does. Finally, others use nonparametric approaches to avoid the linearity constraint placed
on income and wealth. See, e.g., Robert Barsky et al., Accounting for the Black-White Wealth
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studies find income or earnings to be the single best predictor of the wealth
gap -explaining, for example, between twelve and seventy-two percent of the
black-white wealth difference.8 9 Neither these differences in earnings, nor dif-
ferences in education, however, can fully account for the significant racial dif-
ferences in wealth and wealth accumulation. 9"
Some commentators have claimed that cultural differences account for
some of the racial wealth gap. Implicit in this claim are often assertions of dys-
functional behaviors among blacks and some other racial minorities that un-
dermine their ability to save and invest.9 Yet the evidence of racially or cultur-
ally contingent savings and investment behaviors is inconsistent and in any
event too insignificant to account for the generally observed racial wealth
gap. 92 While a number of early studies suggested that blacks actually saved at
Gap: A Nonparametric Approach, 97 J. AM. STAT. ASs'N. 663, 672 (2001) (using a nonpara-
metric approach to find that income alone accounts for sixty-four percent of the wealth gap
between blacks and whites).
89. Scholz & Levine, supra note 86, at 12; id. at 36 ("There is a consensus that labor income ac-
counts for the majority of the racial wealth gap, which suggests that wealth inequality in the
population is likely to be strongly related to inequality in labor income."). Yet some studies
do find that earnings play a larger role in wealth accumulation in the lower half of the
wealth. See Barsky et al., supra note 88; Scholz & Levine, supra note 86, at 12-13.
go. Education and wealth are, of course, highly correlated. Differences in education predict dif-
ferences in earnings, and these differences could then cause differences in wealth. Hence,
looking at the effects of education on the wage-gap may provide a useful view on the wealth
gap. Focusing on highly educated men, Dan Black and others find that measurement error
in the census education measure leads to a modest portion of the wage gap. Dan Black et al.,
Why Do Minority Men Earn Less? A Study of Wage Differentials Among the Highly Educated, 88
REv. ECON. & STAT. 300, 307 (2006). Beyond census measurement error, they observe one
pattern for Hispanic and Asian men (that is, their wage gap with respect to white men is at-
tributable to premarket factors -primarily differences in formal education and English lan-
guage proficiency), id. at 311-12, and another pattern for black men (that is, premarket fac-
tors explain only a fraction (roughly one-quarter) of their wage gap, except "[flor a
subsample of black men born outside the South to parents with some college education,
[wherein] these factors do account for the entire wage gap"), id. at 300.
91. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Education and the Saving Behavior of African-
American and Hispanic Households (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.dartmouth.edu/-alusardi/Papers/EducationAfrican&Hispanic.pdf [http://perma.cc
/6Q2W-VSPJ] (citing Emily C. Lawrance, Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence
from Panel Data, 99 J. POL. ECON. 54 (2001) for the proposition that blacks and Hispanics
are more impatient than whites).
92. The savings rate among blacks generally is lower than that of whites, but this difference
largely goes away when income is taken into account. One study that specifically attempted
to isolate black-white differences in savings rates observed that in one formulation, the
wealth gap would fall by only one percent if black households saved at the same rates as
whites. Maury Gittleman & Edward N. Wolff, Racial Wealth Disparities: Is the Gap Closing? 4
(Levy Econ. Inst. Working Paper No. 311, 2000).
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higher rates than whites, current analyses tend to find little or no differences in
racial savings rates. Maury Gittleman of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and his
collaborator, Edward Wolff, however, did report a higher savings rate among
whites.93 Yet with income taken into account, this difference in the savings rate
explained only one percent of the wealth gap.94 Differences in investments, if
not in savings, might better explain the wealth gap. There is some evidence
that whites earn a higher return on their investments than blacks and that
blacks are more likely than whites to hold liquid (and other lower-return) as-
sets.95 Here again, however, the evidence is mixed and seems largely mediated
by income. As blacks get richer, their asset portfolios and rates of return tend to
look a lot like those of whites in the same income brackets. 96
But income doesn't smooth away all observed racial differences in asset
portfolio and returns. To fill in the gap, researchers have turned their attention
to the effect of family transfers, including gifts and inheritances, as the likely
source of wealth differences between blacks and whites. 97 Some regression es-
timates and simulations suggest that family financial transfers may account for
up to a quarter of the wealth gap. One might predict that gifts and inheritances
would have a large effect on the wealth of advantaged households. Less well-
off families, black or white, simply cannot pass on such benefits to their chil-
dren.98 Family financial transfers, if they play a meaningful role in generating
93. Id. at 8.
94. Id. at 9.
95. See, e.g., Francine D. Blau & John W. Graham, Black-White Differences in Wealth and Asset
Composition, 1O5 Qj. ECON. 321, 332-33 (199o); Nancy A. Jianakoplos & Paul L. Menchik,
Wealth Mobility, 79 R. ECON. STAT. 18 (1997).
96. Gittleman & Wolff, supra note 92, at 8; Scholz & Levine, supra note 86, at 28-29; Ronald L.
Straight, Wealth: Asset-Accumulation Differences by Race - SCF Data, 1995 and 1998, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 330, 332-33 (2002); Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-
1998, at 7 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 300, 2000).
97. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 152; Robert B. Avery & Michael S. Rendall, Lifetime
Inheritances of Three Generations of Whites and Blacks, 107 AM. J. Soc. 1300, 1300 (1997); Blau
& Graham, supra note 95, at 321; Gittleman & Wolff, supra note 92, at 2; Jianakoplos &
Menchik, supra note 95, at 19; James P. Smith, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Wealth in the
Health and Retirement Survey, 30 J. HuM. REs. S158, Si58 (1995); cf. Altonji & Doraszelski,
supra note 88, at 6 ("[T]he legacy of discrimination could lead to a link between intergener-
ational transfers and income that is stronger for whites than for blacks.").
98. "The evidence about the effect of inheritances on the median wealth gap is scant, although
we suspect that inheritances have little or no effect on the wealth of the median household,
instead playing a larger role at the upper end of the wealth distribution." Scholz & Levine,
supra note 86, at 14. "Fewer than half of all households in the [study sample] report having
received an inheritance. Therefore, the median inheritance amount for both whites and
blacks is zero." Id. at 46 n.25.
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the wealth gap, might be expected to have a larger impact among the advan-
taged.
There is strong consensus that the family resource advantage of whites
plays a large role in creating and maintaining the wealth gap, but there is no
agreement about the exact mechanism.99 No doubt this sounds entirely obvi-
ous. The children of wealthy parents eventually grow up to become wealthy
adults. But the claim is not as straightforward as it might appear. It's not clear
how parental wealth affects the wealth of children and whether it operates dif-
ferently for blacks and other racial or ethnic minorities as compared to whites.
Do wealthy parents contribute to their adult children's wealth by investing
more in their early and continuing education? And might racial differences in
the expected returns to education lead to different educational investments by
comparable black and white parents? Or do wealthy parents simply enrich their
children through direct financial contributions, where for historical reasons,
whites have a lot more money to give?
B. Family Feedback Loops
As an empirical matter, the questions above are far from resolved. To the
list of possible mechanisms explaining the racial wealth gap, Roithmayr offers
a novel rhetorical account: "Early anticompetitive conduct garnered for whites
additional wealth, acquired on the backs of slaves or from victims of white car-
tel conduct in unions, homeowners' associations and political parties." 00
Thereafter, family feedback loops simply perpetuate a state of affairs wherein
"white families continue to pass down the ill-gotten wealth they acquired dur-
ing Jim Crow and slavery. Families of color have no such racism dividend to
pass down."'"' These dividends are distributed not only at death, but also, and
99. White households are only slightly more likely than non-white households to have received
intergenerational wealth transfers, but those that have received transfers receive a substan-
tially larger amount. Mark 0. Wilhelm, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Spreading
Asset Ownership, in ASSETS FOR THE POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP
140 (Thomas M. Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds. 2005). There is some evidence that non-
white families spend less on their adult children for every extra dollar of resources than
white families do. See, e.g., Joseph G. Altonji & Ernesto Villanueva, The Marginal Propensity
to Spend on Adult Children, B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y, Feb. 2007, at 36-37 (observing
that for every extra dollar of resources, white parents spend about four cents on their adult
children, whereas non-white parents spend about three cents). The source of the wealth gap
must lie elsewhere.
1oo. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 60.
101. Id. at 57 (emphasis added). "White families pass down far more than families of color, and
family transfers contribute a great deal to racial wealth differences, particularly at the bot-
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perhaps primarily, inter vivos. Roithmayr calls particular attention to two
kinds of inter vivos transfers: "First, white parents help their children to make
a down payment on a house far more often than do nonwhite parents. Second,
white parents help with college tuition, which boosts a child's future earnings
and wealth as well."1"' These are the essential family feedback loops, she ar-
gues, that preserve racial differences over time.
There is empirical support for Roithmayr's argument. Industrial and labor
economist Francine Blau and financial economist John Graham were among
the first to suggest that inter vivos parental transfers and inheritances from
older generation to younger generation whites might explain the black-white
gap in subsequent generations.' 3 Sociologists Melvin Oliver and Thomas
Shapiro brought popular attention to this suggestion in Black Wealth/White
Wealth, showing that the wealth of blacks tends to be less sensitive to income
and other demographic characteristics than the wealth of whites."°4 Oliver and
Shapiro offer a convincing descriptive account of how the legacy of racial dis-
crimination in the United States might perpetuate such wealth differences
through families across generations.10 5 Their account has been supported, as
well as complicated, by a number of more formal statistical analyses conducted
by economists and sociologists (including Oliver and Shapiro themselves). °6
In addition, Dalton Conley has argued that parental wealth is more im-
portant than one's own income for predicting one's wealth. 10 7 Taking into ac-
count parental wealth, along with several other demographic characteristics,
Conley is able to explain fully the average differences in wealth between blacks
and whites.0 8 But the work of some economists points in another direction.
Employing a clever approach to control for family background characteristics,
tom and top of wealth brackets.... Indeed, racial differences in parental wealth are a central
factor in the contemporary racial wealth gap." Id. at 61 (footnotes omitted).
102. Id. at 62.
103. Blau & Graham, supra note 95.
104. OLIVER & SHAPIRO,supra note 88, at 1O9-11.
105. Id.
1O6. See, e.g., OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 88; THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BE-
ING AFRICAN AMERiCAN: How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2004); Joseph G. Altonji
et al., Black/White Differences in Wealth, 24 ECON. PERSPECTIVES 38 (2000); Robert Barsky et
al., supra note 88; Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, The Correlation of Wealth Across Gener-
ations, 111 J. OF POL. ECON. 155 (2003); David Low, Quantifying Explanations for Black-White
Wealth Inequality (New York Univ. Working Paper, 2013), http://www.econ.as.nyu.edu
/docs/IO/28 319/BlackWhiteWealthlnequality.pdf [http://perma.cc/23C8-TM8K]
107. Dalton Conley, Getting into The Black: Race, Wealth & Public Policy, 114 POL. SC. Q 595
(1999).
iog. Id. at 596.
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Joseph Altonji and Ulrich Doraszelski developed an analysis of wealth accumu-
lation focusing on a sample of siblings.'0 9 If parental wealth is important, Al-
tonji and Doraszelski hypothesize, then their analysis should look very differ-
ent when it includes a variable indicating that various individuals in their
sample come from the same family (a family fixed effects approach) compared
to when no such account is made (the standard approach). " Finding little dif-
ference between the fixed effects and standard approach, they reject the claim
that parental wealth explains the significant observed differences in the rates at
which blacks and whites accumulate wealth."' Yet they do not deny that family
background characteristics might affect other aspects of the wealth function."2
In other words, even if parental wealth doesn't help whites get richer faster
than blacks, it might still start them off with a lot more than blacks; in terms of
a (wealth regression) line, whites may have a higher intercept, if not a steeper
slope.
C. Education and Mental Models
Roithmayr's analysis of capital does not focus on only cash, stocks, bonds,
and real property. She recognizes that social capital may be as important, if not
more important, than financial capital in generating and maintaining wealth."'
Consider, for instance, parental spending on elite education for their children.
These expenditures certainly promote their children's educational and occupa-
tional attainment, which is likely to translate into wealth down the road. But
there is more to it than that, as David Wilkins observes: "students attending
elite schools are also socialized into habits and possibilities of eliteness and
granted . . . membership in the elite networks.""14 Moreover, economists Ker-
win Charles and Erik Hurst present evidence showing that parents' passing on
their attitudes about wealth (that is, saving and investment preferences) was a
significant predictor of a child's later wealth."5
In line with these empirical studies, attitude formation and transmission,
particularly in educational settings, are central parts of Roithmayr's thesis,
which she places under the heading of institutional rules. "Institutional rules
log. Altonji & Doraszelski, supra note 88.
11o. Id. at 6-7.
mi1. Id. at 40.
112. Id.
113. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 83-92.
114. David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1915, 1931 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
11s. Charles & Hurst, supra note io6, at 1173-79.
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are the rules of the game that govern the day-to-day operation of an institu-
tion.""16 These rules influence not only what we do, but also how we think
about and justify our choices and those of others."7 "Perhaps most important-
ly," she observes, "institutional rules play an important role in shaping the
mental models that people use to interpret the environment."",,8 As Roithmayr
writes, "these mental models and their accompanying institutional rules can
get stuck in a particular niche, unable to move toward potentially more efficient
rules and mental models."" 9 Mental models and institutional rules often inter-
act to create a perceived neutrality or naturalness to institutional practices,
making them even more secure.
Roithmayr illustrates these claims effectively by looking at law school ad-
missions rules, particularly the early development of the Law School Admis-
sion Test (LSAT). For instance, she observes, "remarkably, law schools wanted
something that correlated specifically to first year grades but not to bar passage
scores."'12 The law schools' admission committees had their reasons for prefer-
ring a test more aligned with first-year grades, but it is far from obvious that
these grades are a better predictor of success in legal practice than bar exam
scores. Bar passage rates and first-year grades, of course, remain highly contro-
versial in law school affirmative action debates.' 2'
Roithmayr also usefully recalls the historical collusion, as told by Jerold
Auerbach, between the American Bar Association and the American Association
of Law Schools to exclude racial and ethnic minorities, along with foreigners,
116. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 71. These rules may be informal, like social etiquette, or formal
and subject to legal enforcement -and sometimes both. "Sometimes institutional rules are
both formal and informal at the same time - in certain places in the US, both legal and social
norms prohibit smoking." Id.
117. Id. at 74 ("Mental models are the internal stories that people use to make sense of their
world and interpret their environment.... Those mental models filter experience and per-




12o. Id. at 78 ("The committee reasoned that because an applicant could take the bar multiple
times, everyone would pass sooner or later, and thus the bar posed no meaningful measure
of the quality for which schools wanted to screen.").
1z1. Compare, e.g., Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REv. 367 (2004), with Ian Ayres & Richard R.W. Brooks, Does Affirma-
tive Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. (2oo5), and David L.
Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools:
An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's Study, 57 STAN L. REv. 1855 (2005), and Wilkins, su-
pra note 114.
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from legal education and practice.12 But active and conscious collusion to ex-
clude on the basis of race or ethnicity is not the story that she is telling in this
part of the book. The argument is subtler. "At a more abstract level, law
schools retain an admissions test that disproportionately excludes students of
color because they think it measures something real about the merit of appli-
cants."" 3 Law school admissions officers are working with a "mental model" of
merit and deservingness that evaluates students based on criteria that were
questionable from the start.' She continues, "[i] n this way, the mental models
that structure our understanding of merit are tied closely to the country's histo-
ry of white privilege." 2 ' Her legal treatment of education here is reminiscent of
Pierre Bourdieu's Homo Academicus, 6 She effectively introduces power explicit-
ly into the discussion, rendering a narrative that is both thoughtful and reveal-
ing.
D. Employment and Housing
"To be sure," Rotihmayr concedes, "this [mental model] narrative risks an
overly static view of the world, as is true of the lock-in model more general-
ly. ' 12z But this concession does not deter her from extending the framework to
employment. She argues that the mental model of merit may be even more dis-
torted when it comes to jobs. "Contrary to some narratives about merit and
hard work," says Roithmayr, "the reality is that a person's chance of getting a
122. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 78 ("Jerold Auerbach and others have documented the connec-
tion between these suspect rules and the desire to exclude certain groups from law
schools.").
123. Id. at 8o.
124. Id. ("Some have pointed out the way in which the mental model of merit that ranks people
by grades or performance both reflects and rationalizes a system that disproportionately
awards resources to one group. According to this argument, we justify the exclusion of peo-
ple of color from law schools by arguing that white students deserve admission because they
did well on the LSAT and got good grades.").
125. Id.
126. See PiERRE BouRLIEu, HOMO ACADEMIcUs 69 (Peter Collier trans., Stanford University
Press 1988) (1984) (discussing academic power and the production and reproduction of so-
cial structures, particularly in law, where knowledge works "in the service of order and pow-
er" as opposed to academic disciplines where knowledge scrutinizes "order and power, aim-
ing.., at analyzing them as they are, at analyzing the nature of social order and the state").
127. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 8o ("The world does change, as do people's mental models.
Some schools briefly experimented with waiving the LSAT for undergraduates from their
home institutions with certain qualifications, and an American Bar Association committee
has voted twice in straw polls to remove the LSAT requirement, in part for the reasons dis-
cussed. But the ideology of merit dies hard, and is likely to persist so long as whites continue
to enjoy disproportionate admission." (citation omitted)).
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good job depends quite heavily on her social network. "12s Social links repro-
duce racial employment inequality though formal and informal job net-
works. 29 Network size and density is influenced by one's racial context. 3 '
Class, again, is a driving factor, 13' as is the early history of discrimination;
13
Roithmayr argues, "even if all intentional discrimination were to end tomor-
row, social networks would continue to reproduce gaps in wages and employ-
ment status."1 33 Racial homophily, operative for whites as well as blacks, con-
tinues to separate networks.'3
Long-established institutional rules and practices continue to disfavor mi-
norities, but, explains Roithmayr, these are not the main factors securing mod-
ern-day racial inequality. Segregation perpetuates our present inequality. "If
social networks were to be integrated," Roithmayr observes, "then the re-
sources contained in those networks might be more evenly shared. Job referrals
would be doled out more evenly. Family help for housing and college would be
shared among nonwhite children as fairly as among white children." 3' With
this line of argument, Roithmayr shifts the inquiry from inequality to segrega-
tion, with residential segregation, in particular, underwriting many of the dif-
ferences in institutional access and wealth discussed throughout the book.
128. Id. at 89.
129. Id.
13o. "In particular, research demonstrates that compared to whites, black and Latino job seekers
have networks that are smaller in size and have fewer links per person to potential employ-
ment." Id.
131. See id. ("Social networks for ghetto residents are much smaller and the contacts that they do
have are less likely to be employed or fully employed than people of color from low-poverty
neighborhoods."); id. at 91 ("As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the key problem is
that networks are segregated by race and also by class.").
132. Id. at 89 ("It comes as no surprise to learn that as an empirical matter, owing to historical
discrimination, blacks and Latinos are far more likely to reside in the layers of hierarchy at
the bottom, far from direct access to employment. At the same time, black and brown net-
works are less likely to be well connected to people further up the referral hierarchy. Owing
to the self-reinforcing dynamics of networks, people of color are more likely to remain at the
bottom of the hierarchy over time, and are at greatest risk for becoming (and remaining) a
marginalized class if circumstances push a referral network below its critical threshold.").
133. Id. at 91.
134. Roithmayr argues: "Social psychologists tell us that... networks remain segregated simply
because like tends to attract like. Social psychologists call this attractive force 'homophily.'
... In addition, people form their social networks in places - neighborhoods, schools, work-
places- that tend to be segregated ... even in communities where there is little or no inten-
tional discrimination." Id. (citation omitted).
135. Id. "Intermarriage and integrated social networks, to say nothing of integrated neighbor-
hoods, would go a long way toward redistributing wealth." Id.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Roithmayr effectively enlists both theoretical and empirical literatures on
racial housing patterns, and she confronts class issues most explicitly in the
chapter focusing on how neighborhood effects reproduce racial segregation.
While observing that wealth and class differences are maintained though con-
temporary housing and neighborhood feedback loops,, 36 the history of residen-
tial and racial discrimination is never far removed from her analysis. "Restric-
tive covenants paved the way to residential segregation, as homeowners'
associations policed against the entry of blacks and Latinos into all-white
neighborhoods. Residential segregation, in turn, structured racial differences
in wealth, social networks, and institutional networks of distribution."137
Two lingering questions are suggested by the discussion of historical seg-
regation in this context. First, why start with Jim Crow and not, for instance,
slavery? Where to begin-the so-called starting gate problem-is a challenge
faced by all equality theorists." 8 Roithmayr is aware of the issue and some of
the knotty questions it raises.' 39 "What would have happened if the govern-
ment had made good on its promise of forty acres and a mule to American
136. "Finally, we should note that residential segregation in particular has played a central role in
persistent wealth disparity." Id. at 67.
137. Id. at 67. Jim Crow policies assured that blacks would have not only inadequate housing,
but also inferior neighborhood amenities, from schools and other social services to even in-
ferior water and sewage services. See Werner Troesken, The Limits ofJim Crow: Race and the
Provision of Water and Sewerage Services in American Cities, 188o-1925, 62 J. EcoN. HIST., 734
(2002). There is evidence that in some cities, such as Memphis, Tennessee, fear of typhoid
and other water-borne diseases moving from black to white households motivated officials
to install "extensive and equitable [water and sewer] systems that appear to have benefited
both whites and blacks." Id. at 748. However, evidence from other cities, like Savannah,
Georgia, reveal that with sufficient segregation officials were able commit "to under-provide
African Americans with sewer and water services." Id.
138. See FISHKIN, supra note 7, at 65-74.
139. For example, she observes the possibility of competing starting gates. "We can actually trace
the starting point for race differences in wealth even farther back," she writes, "to Jim Crow
and slavery." ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 62. But the Jim Crow period and our long history
of slavery are very different points - not to mention the differences within these periods. Are
blacks from the American South who trekked north during the great migrations at the same
starting gate with West Indian immigrants who moved to northern U.S. cities during Jim
Crow-to say the least of poor European immigrants? Identifying the right moment, or
starting gate, when comparing the outcomes of two or more groups or individuals may be
the biggest challenge to equality of opportunity arguments.
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former slaves?" 4  Clear answers to such questions are, of course, elusive.
However, because the starting points are so central to her lock-in theory,
Roithmayr might have done a little more to explain what are her relevant
points of departure, for which groups, and why.
This brings us to the second lingering matter in this section: is there any-
thing distinctive about black or Latino inequality, and, if so, how do racial cov-
enants and the like help us to appreciate this distinction? Racial restrictions
were notoriously inclusive in their list of excluded groups. While "Whites On-
ly" or "Caucasians Only" were common in covenants, just as often there was an
enumerated list of groups who were unwelcome in the neighborhood. "Arme-
nians, Jews, Hebrews, Persians[,] and Syrians, or anyone else of the 'Semitic
race"' were identified for exclusion in some covenants, as were, of course, per-
sons of "Negro, African, or Asiatic race," in addition to Mongolians, Mexicans,
and numerous other nationalities. 4 Since all of these groups, and unnamed
others, suffered from unfair cartel-like conduct facilitated through covenants,
by which criterion are blacks and Latinos selected for redress? Roithmayr, no
doubt, has an answer to this question, but it is not clear from the text. One is
left wishing for more discussion on how she selected the starting points and
groups for her analysis. 2
140. Id. A recent paper by Melinda Miller provides some evidence for this thought experiment.
Comparing the outcomes of former slaves generally to those from the Cherokee Nation-
which, in contrast to the failed larger promise of "40 acres and a mule," actually provided
opportunities for freedmen to claim land-Miller reports that former Cherokee slaves had
greater absolute wealth and experienced a smaller racial "wealth gap" than former slaves of
the Confederacy in 188o. Moreover, the children of Cherokee freedmen continued to experi-
ence these advantages in 19oo. Melinda C. Miller, Land and Racial Wealth Inequality, lol AM.
ECON. REV. 371, 373-75 (2011); Melinda C. Miller, The One Thing Needful: Free Land and
Black Mobility, 188o-19oo (Nov. 2o11) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author), http ://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Workshops-Seminars/Economic
-History/miller-ii1115.pdf [http://perma.cc/VDF2-PTMW].
141. BROOKS &ROSE, supra note 43, at 222, 233 n.4, 252 n.9.
142. Fortunately, for the truly curious, some answers are available in Roithmayr's articles. See,
e.g., Roithmayr, supra note lo, at 78: "It is important to point out that the racial cartel story
appears to be historically specific to African Americans, Mexicans and some Asian groups."
Roithmayr further observes, "other groups like Asians and White ethnic groups (Irish, East-
ern European Jews and other immigrant groups) have faced similar anticompetitive exclu-
sion at various times in this country's history. But important historical differences separate
the experience of these groups .... Comparatively speaking, Jews and many Asian groups
have not experienced either the magnitude or duration of anti-competitive exclusion experi-
enced by these groups." Id.
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V. THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS
In the first chapter of Reproducing Racism, Roithmayr quickly casts off an
admittedly "[i]ncomplete and [u]nsatisfying" 43 set of alternative theoretical
explanations for persistent racial inequality, beginning with conventional eco-
nomic accounts' and then moving swiftly through various psychological,1 4
biological, 6 cultural,' 47 and structural arguments. 8 Her lock-in logic is, of
143. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 13.
144. Gary Becker's model of actors exhibiting a "taste for discrimination" opens a succinct and
useful discussion of irrational and rational discrimination. Id. at 15-17.
145. The discussion here is essentially limited to bias and implicit attitudes measured by the Im-
plicit Association Test. Roithmayr raises some of the familiar challenges to (and defenses of)
the JAT, including questions about what exactly the test is measuring and the applicability
of split-second discrimination in everyday life. Id. at 20-21. Beyond that, psychological mod-
els get short shrift here. Although she begins generally by mentioning psychological mecha-
nisms grounded in stereotypes, there is no discussion of stereotype threat -considered in,
for example, Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 797 (1995), or aversive
racism, discussed in, for example, John F. Dovideo & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism
and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCH. SCIENCE 315 (2000), or other conscious and
subconscious psychological accounts of racial decision making and behavior either by major-
ity or minority group members that might account for persistent inequality across groups.
Of course, one book does not need to address every psychological theory concerning race in
fine detail (there are quite a few), but the fact that she doesn't even touch on a number of
the more basic theories gives the discussion here an ad hoc quality.
146. The chapter begins with Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray's polemic The Bell
Curve, which reinvigorated old and ugly debates on race, genetic differences, and measured
intelligence. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 13. After that there is little mention of the topic,
beyond a brief mention of Stephen Jay Gould's discussion of "the darker days of our intel-
lectual history, in which scholars argued that blacks and 'Mongoloids' were inferior because
of their physiological or genetic characteristics." Id. at 17. Roithmayr notes that, "as time
passed, most if not all of these ideas were thoroughly discredited as scientifically unsupport-
ed, although the ideas did reappear in modified and more sophisticated form from time to
time, as was true in The Bell Curve." Id. at 18.
147. Roithmayr nicely reminds us where the cultural explanations originated. "Anthropologist
Oscar Lewis first made the now-infamous argument that a 'culture of poverty' explained
persistent gaps." Id. at 21. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, however, may be particularly
associated with this claim, which remains popular among a number of conservative com-
mentators. Off. Pol'y Planning & Res.,The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, U.S.
DEP'T LAB. (1965), http://www.dol.gov/oasami/programs/history/webid-meynihan.htm
[http://perma.cc/4XVR-4XFD].
148. Here Roithmayr thoughtfully and importantly connects structural constraints -like segre-
gation within (or spatial mismatch between) residential and employment sites -to cultural
claims. The connection, of course, is important for her favored explanation. ROiTHMAYR,
supra note 2, at 23 ("As this book will argue, the best explanations assert that culture and
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course, itself a kind of structural argument, building on earlier economic mod-
els. 4 9 To illustrate the operation of lock-in, Roithmayr makes use of several
path-dependency stories . 5  Readers will find some of these accounts familiar,
such as the Q WERTY keyboard and the VHS versus Betamax stories. Her dis-
cussion of the Polya urn experiment, however, will likely be new to many law-
yers and some legal scholars, although old hat to mathematicians.' The exper-
iment begins with an urn containing an equal number of red and white balls.' 2
Next, the experimenter selects a single ball at random from the urn and returns
it along with a new ball of the same color. At this point there is no longer an
equal number of red and white balls in the urn. There is exactly one more ball
of one color than the other. A second ball is then randomly selected from the
urn and returned with another ball of the some color. Then a third ball is se-
lected and returned with another of the same color, and so on.
structure reflect and reproduce each other in a positive feedback loop that moves from cul-
ture to structure and back again.").
149. The key insight is attributed to the economist Glenn Loury, whom Roithmayr identifies as
the first to suggest "that persistent racial gaps might be traced to feedback loops, though
they weren't called that yet." Id. at 23. She writes:
Loury pointed out that residentially segregated neighborhoods produce under-
funded schools, and parents with poorly connected social networks decreased a
child's chances of getting a job. In particular, children from those neighborhoods
or those parental networks are less likely to get (or have to pay more to get) the
training to do skilled work. Accordingly, each generation suffered the depriva-
tions of the prior generation and reproduced them for the next generation.
Id. at 23-24.
1So. Here it might have been useful to introduce Oliver Williamson's notion of the "fundamental
transformation," wherein the winner of some initially competitive contest (say, for example,
a supplier in a competitive bidding process) acquires monopoly or market power, or some
other advantage, in future contests. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 61 (1985). Roithmayr relies
more on the language of "switching costs," ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 113-118, 136-38,
which are of course related to the former notion, that is, "transaction-specific know-how
and skills and the difficulties of skill transfer mean that it will be costly to switch to an alter-
native supplier." Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical In-
tegration in the Automobile Industry, 13 BELL J. ECON. 206, 206 (1982).
5l1. See, e.g., David Blackwell & James B. MacQueen, Ferguson Distributions Via Polya Urn
Schemes, 1 ANNALS STAT. 353 (1973).
i2. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 28. Roithmayr here relies on W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING
RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994) for the description of the experi-
ment. An accessible and engaging discussion of the experiment can be found in Joel E. Co-
hen, How Is the Past Related to the Future?, CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUD. BEHAV. SCI. (1982).
Going beyond the basic two-color dichotomy, Blackwell and MacQZueen extend the result to
a continuum of colors. Blackwell & MacQueen, supra note 151.
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The relevant feature of this experiment for Roithmayr is that while there
may be large fluctuations in the percentage of red and white balls following the
initial rounds of draws, "at some key threshold point in the drawing process, as
the urn continues to fill," she writes, "the percentage of reds and whites settles
at a particular proportion, and remains very stable for all later draws. Amazing-
ly, later events don't change the final percentages."' 3
As if by magic, the urn suddenly and dramatically settles down to some
fixed and quite durable proportion of red and white balls[,] no matter
how many more draws the experimenter completes .... Even more in-
teresting, this ending proportion will vary from experiment to experi-
ment. In one run, the urn might settle into a proportion Of 22 [sic] per-
cent red and 68 percent white. On a subsequent run, the proportion
might instead end up at 78 percent red.' 4
Figure i shows five simulations of the Polya urn experiment that I ran.'
Figure i.




0 200 400 6oo Soo 1000
Number of Draws
153. RoITHmAYR, supra note 2, at 28.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Program and log files on file with author.
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Roithmayr's observation concerning the highly variable ending proportions
is clearly apparent in the figure. Two simulations settle with less than twenty
percent red balls, two above eighty percent, and one with a little more than
thirty percent. Moreover, notwithstanding the high variance at the start, the
tail of each distribution ends up fairly flat. In other words, "the urn's early his-
tory matters far more than later history, because the early draws chart the path
that subsequent developments will reinforce. By analogy," writes Roithmayr,
"the early history of competition among racial groups can explain contempo-
rary outcomes."'' 6 Exactly how does this analogy work? "In much the same
way that the early draws of the urn determined the ultimate composition of the
urn," Roithmayr tells us, "those early rounds of economic, social, and political
competition among the races were rigged anticompetitively by racial cartels."
57
But that framing doesn't quite fit. Early selection in the urn isn't "rigged."
It's random. Selection is determined by the relative proportions of red and
white balls. Proximity, connectedness, and neighborhood effects play no role in
the selection process. There is no color segregation within the urn. The balls
are all always mixed up. The Polya urn experiment describes a process that
locks in certain proportions based on distributions established by early ran-
domness. At each round, each ball, regardless of its color, has fair odds of being
selected when the experimenter reaches in the urn and picks one. If red balls
are disfavored, it is merely because they are numerical minorities. But
Roithmayr isn't telling a story about numerical minorities. She is concerned
with racial and ethnic minorities.
Non-Hispanic whites in the United States are projected to fall below the
threshold of numerical majority in 2042, with continued declining relative
numbers thereafter1,8 As whites increasingly become numerical minorities,
their chances of being selected for society's prizes and privileges should fall - if
selection is made as it is in the urn. Roithmayr's argument, however, implies
that white advantage will persist even as their numbers fall. This doesn't mean
the Polya urn is a poor analogy for her argument. For instance, perhaps it is not
how balls in the urn are selected that's telling, but rather how new balls are
brought in.
Among other things, the traditional Polya urn experiment describes a pro-
cess of inclusion that is entirely biased. Exclusion is not a salient frame of the
156. ROITHMAYR, supra note 2, at 28-29.
157. Id. at 28-29. She continues, "If the early draws favored whites, it should now come as no
surprise that the urn is now mostly white." Id. at 29.
158. Grayson K. Vincent & Victoria A. Velkoff, The Next Four Decades: The Older Population in the
United States: 2010 to 2050, U.S. CENsUs BUREAU 1 (May 2010), http://www.census.gov/prod
/2olopubs/p25-1138.pdf [http://perma.cc/CCM3-FTSZ] .
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Polya urn. Disfavored-color balls are not removed or prohibited from the urn.
All the bias results from the method of inclusion. Recall that each ball selected
from the urn is returned with a ball of the same color. We might say that the
selected ball invites a same-colored partner-ball back to the urn in a manner
akin to the kind of racial patronage that Roithmayr described as operating in
job networks. Nothing is happening to the numerically disfavored balls in the
urn-or at least that's one way of looking at the process. This too is a feature of
Rotihmayr's narrative account, an important but subtle feature, which the Pol-
ya urn makes exceedingly clear: everybody knows that it is wrong to exclude
based on color, but including those "like you" is perfectly natural and good,
just like family and friends. That, at least, is one way of looking at things.5 9
Consider another way- that is, another process of adding balls to the urn.
What if the selected ball were made to return with a ball of a different color?
The result of that experiment, which I call the "anti-urn," is shown in Figure
2.16o Again, there is significant fluctuation in the early draws, but very quickly
the proportions of red and white balls settle down at near equality. An experi-
ment is hardly needed to appreciate this result. By including balls of the non-
selected color, the experimenter constantly adds countervailing probability
mass to achieve a balance. Roithmayr, it is fair to say, may likely endorse this
inclusion criterion. Even though it is as color conscious as the original Polya
experiment, this inclusion criterion brings balance to the urn, which in turn
makes selection of red and white balls equally likely.
Figure 2.
ANTI-URN (ADDING BALL OF OTHER COLOR)
00
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An alternative method to approach balance in the urn, and therefore an al-
ternative method to move selection toward equality, would be for the experi-
menter to choose at random the color of the new ball that is to be placed in the
urn along with the selected ball. No doubt such an approach would lead to
equality, although perhaps not with the same efficiency and speed as would be
achieved by color-conscious inclusion of balls different in color from the ones
selected. 6, One may read into Roithmayr's discussion that it is too late in the
game for that kind of neutral selection. It is a tempting leap, to suggest, for in-
stance, that if we are already in the settled tail of a traditional Polya urn pro-
cess, it would not matter much if the experimenter suddenly started to ran-
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Caution would be warranted in taking that leap. The analogy breaks down
in attempting to resist random inclusion by arguing that nothing would
change after the early history has set its course. The course can be altered by a
random process. Consider, for example, a traditional Polya urn process where
after the first one hundred draws, the experimenter begins to add balls of a
randomly chosen color instead of the same color as the selected ball. The result
from several runs of this experiment is shown in Figure 4. Variable proportions
are kicked off by the early history of arbitrary draws, but eventually conver-
gence toward equality is reached by including balls of randomly chosen colors.
Figure 4.







What insights are gained from the traditional Polya urn experiment and its
variations? Path dependency established by early advantage and followed by
mechanisms of inclusion based on likeness can lock-in long-term patterns of
inequality. But if the mechanisms of inclusion are changed, long-term patterns
can also, in time, change. Hence, one may be optimistic, as Roithmayr ulti-
mately is, about the possibility of change and the possibility of some equality.
Mundane matters of selection and inclusion must, however, be carefully con-
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sidered. Ostensibly fair contests, such as random draws from an urn or color-
blind tests of formal equality-won't necessarily lead to real equality if biased
mechanisms interact with the contests.
Consider, for example, Bernard Williams's fable of the warrior society,
where after a prolonged period hereditary caste-based discrimination in favor
of warrior families, the society changed to fair and formal contests for the
award of privileged positions. 62 Children of the old warrior families continued
to secure privilege, not because the contests were rigged (for they were now
fair), but because their family advantage had better prepared them for the con-
test. Families biased the contest. It's not hard to understand. Who wouldn't
give their child every advantage possible?
Warrior families, in the end, are just like all other families. It is this fact
that makes Williams's fable so broadly accessible. In much the same way that
Williams makes use of the warrior society, Roithmayr deploys Polya urns-
along with QWERTY keyboards, VHS tapes, operating programs, racial cove-
nants, wildcat strikes, and market cartelization, among other descriptions-to
offer graspable narratives on an elusive topic. There is something for everyone
to grab hold of here. And it is this diversity that makes Roithmayr's account so
broadly accessible and effective.
CONCLUSION
In 2007 Chief Justice Roberts wrote, "[t]he way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. ' ' 6' A provocative
tautology, borrowed without attribution from the lower court, 64 its purpose
was entirely rhetorical. Roberts was urging that the time had come for the
Court, if not the nation, to look beyond race. Race no longer mattered, he im-
plied, except among racist integrationists and the like. Barack Obama's presi-
dential election the following year gave fleeting support to this view of a post-
racial America. Yet by 2014, when racial discourse hit a fever pitch with protests
162. Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
1956-1972, at 230-249 (1973); see also Fishkin, supra note 7, at 11-13, 24-82 (offering an ex-
tended discussion of Williams's Idea of Equality in the context of competing theories of
equality of opportunity, including his own).
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164. "The way to end racial discrimination is to stop discriminating by race." Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F. 3d 1162, 1222 (9 th Cir., 2005) (Bea, J., dissent-
ing). For some discussion on the origins of the expression, see Eugene Volokh, The Origin of
"The Way To Stop Discrimination on the Basis of Race Is To Stop Discriminating on the Basis
of Race," VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 17, 2007, 10:3o AM), http://volokh.comVposts
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and riots throughout the country,"' it was implausible to claim that race no
longer mattered. The only question was how race mattered. "Race matters,"
Justice Sotomayor wrote in that fitful year, "in part because of the long history
of racial minorities being denied access to the political process .... Race also
matters because of persistent racial inequality in society- inequality that can-
not be ignored and that has produced stark socioeconomic disparities. ',, 66 The-
se are the essential challenges advanced by Roithmayr. What is to be done? So-
tomayor, again, offers an answer: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis
of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the
Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial dis-
crimination.,67 Readers of Reproducing Racism will be well primed for the diffi-
cult yet crucial conversation that awaits.
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-different-reaction/2ol4/2/o4/bf4a482c-7bdg- lle4-b821-5o3cc7efedge_story.html [http://
perma.cc/ 4 DTG-M52J]; Reid J. Epstein, Poll: Views of Race Relations Worse Than Before
Obama Took Office, WALL ST. J: WASH. WIPLE (Dec. 17, 2014, 12:09 AM), http://blogs
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